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The aim of the paper is to understand how the organization of public administration in Central 
Asia shapes the results of economic development in the region. It discusses the main factors 
of bad quality of public administration in the region, paying particular attention to the link 
between political regimes and public administration. Moreover, it provides an overview of 
decentralization and devolution of power in Central Asian countries as one of the main 
channels of transformation of administration. The paper covers both formal decentralization 
and informal distribution of power between levels of government. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The paper was written within the framework of the project “Emerging Market Economies in 
Central Asia: The Role of Institutional Complementarities in Reform Process”. 
1. Introduction 
  While the first generation of economic reforms focused mainly on development of the 
framework for markets, including privatization and liberalization, the current debated is 
centered around the “second transition” reforms, including the organization of governance at 
different level: within individual businesses (corporate governance), on markets (competition 
policy) and in the state apparatus (public administration), able to make markets work. 
However, reforms in this sphere turned out even more problematic, than the establishment of 
basic market institutions. This paper focuses on the quality of public administration in the 
countries of Central Asia. In particular, it looks at four post-Soviet republics: Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Most of them carried out at least certain forms 
of first-generation reforms (though in Uzbekistan and to a certain extend in Tajikistan the 
deficits even in this field are severe), and all of them face the problem of development of 
efficient public administration. Moreover, all four countries are to a certain extend similar to 
each other from the point of view of political regime. The fifth country of the region – 
Turkmenistan – differs substantially from the rest of the region, both because of lack of even 
elementary market reforms and strict authoritarian political system and is therefore considered 
only briefly.  
The paper starts with surveying the main indicators of economic effects of public 
administration. Moreover, it focuses on different approaches to explain the problems of public 
administration. It pays particular attention to the connection between public administration 
and political regimes. Most countries of Central Asia provide good examples of negative 
effects of hybrid regimes on public administration. Finally, a significant part of the paper is 
devoted to the problem of decentralization. One of the often neglected problems of the 
transition studies is to correctly define the object of studies: it is hardly sufficient to consider 
the national level of political decision making and economic reforms. Both international 
economic and political ties (Ananyin, 2005: 129-131) and subnational administrative and 
market structures are transformed. Decentralization and devolution of power to self-
governance institutions is often considered to be one of the key elements of successful 
transformation of public administration in transition countries. The problem is, however, that 
the de-jure devolution covers only the top of the iceberg: an even more important feature is 
the development of informal relations between governments and regional elites. Informality 
of decentralization and specifics of political system make its effects for the development of 
public administration (and thus economic institutions) problematic. 
 
2. Quality of public administration in central Asia 
 The countries of the region have been known for a notoriously low quality of public 
administration. The enforcement of the rule of law in Central Asia is bad; moreover, the 
bureaucracy in Central Asian countries is not only unable to protect the property rights, but is 
itself a source of major disturbance for the private enterprises. The Doing Business 2008 
survey of the World Bank demonstrates the persistence of administrative barriers in Central 
Asia.1 The performance of the countries summarized in Figure 1 demonstrates significant 
problems of state administration; in particular, the excessive licensing, barriers to 
international trade, and, in most countries, excessive and arbitrary taxation, seem to be an 
important obstacle for business in Central Asia. Although Turkmenistan is not covered by the 
Doing Business survey, it is safe to say that in this country the absence of elementary human 
rights implies the absence of the rule of law (BenYishay and Betancourt, 2008). Moreover, in 
spite of several governmental reforms in the public administration described in the next 
section, business community still perceives significant lack of commitment of the 
governments to remove administrative barriers (Suhir and Kovach, 2003). 
 
Figure 1: Doing Business in Central Asia 
Source: World Bank Doing Business 2008; the numbers refer to the position in the rating of Doing Business 
(178 countries), where low numbers indicate better business environment. 
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 An advantage of this survey is that it does focus on objective rather than perception-based measures, which 
play an important role in the World Bank governance indicators. 
One of the main problems for regional economies from the point of view of protective 
state is a very high level of corruption. Corruption is endemic in all countries of Central Asia, 
covering all spheres of economic activity. Currently it seems to be routinized in the 
governmental hierarchies (Osipian, 2007). It is claimed that in several cases public agencies 
are taken over by private interests and criminal activities (Karklins, 2002); in the majority of 
cases corruption is the “connecting material” for the nexus of political, bureaucratic and 
business actors playing the crucial role in the economies of the region, where public officials 
seem to play the leading role. The “control of corruption” indicator of the World Bank 
governance studies indeed indicates an extremely high perceived level of corruption in 
Central Asian economies (see Figure 2). The only country with positive dynamics is 
Tajikistan recovering from the civil war; other countries either stagnate or worsen their 
corruption environment. 
 
Figure 2: Control of corruption index in Central Asia 
Source: World Bank Governance indicators; the numbers vary from 0 to 100 with 100 indicating the highest 
control of corruption 
 Swartz et al. (2008) apply the data of the BEEPS survey (2002) of the World Bank to 
compare the level of perceived corruption in the countries of the region and conclude that 
large countries (Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan) are perceived to be less corrupt, than smaller 
ones (Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan) and that there is no clear distinction between 
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan: both countries are perceived to be less corrupt in different 
dimensions. Tajikistan seems to be the most corrupt country in the region. One should, 
however, notice that the firm-level corruption survey of BEEPS provides a much better 
evaluation of corruption in Uzbekistan (as well as Belarus) than other indicators, mostly 
because BEEPS provides a much better evidence of administrative corruption (i.e. bribes paid 
by businesses to public officials), which are obviously less important in Uzbekistan due to 
predominance of the public sector (Knack, 2006). Moreover, repressive political system limits 
the access to information. To provide just one example of administrative interventions, in 
2002 the presidential decree made re-nationalization of any enterprise possible, if it has 
changed the “main direction of its activity” (Olcott, 2005: 156-157). The new round of the 
BEEPS survey (2005) indicates negative dynamics of Kyrgyz Republic from the point of 
view of corruption. 
 
3.  Determinants of quality of the public administration 
3.1. Incentives and resources 
The deficits of the public administration in the countries of Central Asia could be 
related to two parameters. On the one hand, they may be caused by the structure of incentives 
governing the relations in the public sector, causing inefficient patterns of behavior. On the 
other hand, the main factor of bureaucratic inefficiencies may be the deficit of resources 
available for the public administration, which is therefore unable to execute its functions. 
Both factors are interrelated; accumulation of resources for public administration depends 
upon the size of the shadow economy, which, in turn, is crucially determined by the cost-
benefit relations of the legalization decision; and bureaucrats adjust their behavior to the 
available resources. From the “incentives” point of view, the poor quality of bureaucracy in 
Central Asia may be related to informal institutions of the society and political regimes. The 
“resources” point of view suggests that the low quality of public administration depends upon 
the institutional capacity of the state, which, in turn, may be influenced by the political 
instability and economic development. 
 The informal institutions point of view on bureaucratic inefficiency (as well as on 
failures of transition in general) has been quite popular in the literature so far (Leipold, 2006). 
It suggests that the behavior of bureaucrats and their “customers” in the private sector is 
governed by the long-lasting informal rules, inherited from the Soviet or even pre-Soviet past. 
Basically, these rules could refer to two areas of activities. First, they determine the 
omnipresence of corruption in the countries of Central Asia as a traditional instrument of 
“problem-solving” accepted by both public officials and population (Taskanov, 2001). Unlike 
the “European” corruption, i.e. informal payments for “excessive” services or “privileged” 
treatment, the “Asian” corruption comprises informal payments for any services of the 
government agencies. Central Asia seems to have been particularly corrupt even in the Soviet 
Union. Second, the relations within the governmental apparatus are governed not by formal 
rules and hierarchies, but by informal power balance between individual clans. It is necessary 
to note that informal “gift exchange” in bureaucracy exists in various countries and may 
increase the efficiency of public sector as well (Dodlova, Yudkevich, 2006); Chavance 
(2008:67) points out the problems related with the concept of transparency which is key for 
criticism against informal relations in bureaucracies. In heterogeneous countries informal 
structures, can however become an important source of unequal treatment in the law 
implementation, which is sometimes considered the cornerstone of an efficient governance 
system (Rothstein, Teorell, 2005).  It seems to be true for the Central Asian region, where 
informal relations connect particular groups of bureaucrats seem to have strong connections in 
both legal and illegal sectors of economy (Marat, 2006). 
The origin of these interests and identities separating the bureaucratic corps can differ: 
the literature refers to the traditional tribal interests, as well as the Soviet legacy (Starr, 2006; 
Jones Luong, 2001) and can broadly be related as the system of “clans” dominating the 
Central Asian bureaucracies, as well as politics and economies. The main question is, 
however, the degree of persistence of these institutions, especially in the bureaucracy. First, 
the informal practices are not inflexible: Moskovskaya (2005) provides an overview of 
changes occurring on the microlevel in Central Asian societies. Second, Central Asian 
governments (in particular, in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan) invested heavily in the 
international training of high-ranked bureaucrats (they paid at least more attention to it than 
Russia, still heavily influenced by the “delusions of grandeur” of its own educational system); 
in fact, the absence of traditional Soviet schools of thought is sometimes considered one of 
the reasons for successful reforms in some areas in Kazakhstan – in particular, in the banking 
regulation (Marchenko, 2005). It can also have at least a certain impact on the functioning of 
bureaucracies in these countries. Perlman and Gleason (2007) show that divergence of reform 
paths in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan is influenced rather by policy choice than by institutional 
values. Although one can hardly claim that traditional clans play no role in the 
administrations of Central Asian countries, it is probably necessary not to overestimate their 
importance as opposed to the alternative “incentive-based” and also “resource-based” 
explanations.   
The second source of incentives for bureaucrats can therefore be related to the current 
organization of the public administration (including both formal and informal incentives). It is 
also obviously a result of a path-dependent process, but at least may be more flexible than the 
rigid informal institutions and practices. First, there are still important deficits in the 
organization of bureaucracies in Central Asia, which have been developed for a relatively 
short period of time. Alongside with deficits in the legal system (Kangas, 2004), the deficits 
in the formal structure of public management may have detrimental effect on incentives for 
officials. Some countries of the region invest heavily in the development of bureaucracy; it is 
true particularly for Kazakhstan, which implemented a series of administrative reforms prior 
to other CIS states (with the only exception of Russia). In 1998 it established a special Public 
Service Agency to co-ordinate the transformation of the public administration. In 2000 the 
political positions were separated from administrative ones, which are protected by the 
irremovability rule included in the law (Mahmutova, 2001). The most recent initiatives 
include: (1) administrative directives (reglament) for each public service, specifying the exact 
list of actions to be carried out by a public official in a particular situation; the basic standards 
were passed in Summer 2007 (the first country in the CIS) and are monitored by the 
Disciplinary Councils of the Public Service Agency; (2) outcome-oriented budgeting in public 
service; the Concept of Public Planning, passed by the government of Kazakhstan in 
December 2007, suggests that the outcome-oriented budgeting and planning should be 
implemented at all levels of public service and for all public programs; (3) strategic long-term 
planning for all public agencies; (4) appointment of special representatives of the president in 
all public agencies. Nevertheless, the ambitious plans of administrative reform in Kazakhstan 
face the traditional problems of post-Soviet countries: they fail to have a real impact on the 
behavior of public officials, are often inconsequent and hardly implemented (Alternativa, 
2007).  The deficit of real public control over bureaucracies either makes the implementation 
of any reform problematic, or creates an additional source of revenue-extraction for public 
officials.  
However, at least from the point of view of formal reforms Kazakhstan outperforms 
other countries, which failed to develop even the basic rules for public service. It is true 
especially for Turkmenistan, but also to a certain extend for Uzbekistan. Perlman and Gleason 
(2005) claim that administrative reform in Central Asia is to a great extend an outcome of 
external pressure from international organizations, than of internal political shifts. Their 
analysis of administrative reform in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan suggests the existence of two 
main strategies: while the former focuses on the “stationary bandit” strategy, investing into 
improving the bureaucracy and thus enhancing economic growth to extract more rents, while 
Uzbekistan carried out reforms aiming to direct resources to the ruling elite regardless of 
economic consequences.  
The other side of the discussion is represented by the “resource” arguments. The 
question is whether relatively poor Central Asian countries are able to create an efficient 
public sector at all. In fact, there is a certain relation between resource endowment and quality 
of public services. For example, in Kazakhstan the main reason for popular dissatisfaction 
with the services of Ministry of Justice is the too long waiting time; it, however, seems to 
crucially depend on the number of requests to be served by public officials and hence by the 
size of bureaucratic staff (Turisbekov et al., 2007). The problem of resource constraints is 
particularly acute for smaller countries like Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan, which indeed 
seem to face a resource constraint in their economic development, rather than for rich oil 
exporting countries like Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Treisman (2003) shows, 
that in the post-Communist world corruption is well predicted by the initial level of economic 
development at the start of the transition. These factors may also be at work in Central Asia.  
However, resource constraint is not limited to purely economic component: it may 
also reflect the absence of qualified personnel for public agencies, and in this case influence 
all countries of the region regardless of their oil and gas wealth. The problem is that partial 
replacement of bureaucracies with newly appointed (and even internationally trained) staff is 
often insufficient to change the behavioral patterns; new bureaucrats, in spite of their 
international experience, are likely to quickly adapt to existing structures. A solution 
implemented in some countries of the CIS is to dissolve the complete agency and to construct 
a new one from scratch: however, the only case of relative success is Georgia, which was able 
to replace the old highly corrupt traffic police (it is may be one of the most corrupt institutions 
in the post-Soviet world; and it is perceived as the most corrupt structure by the population of 
Kazakhstan, see Turisbekov et al., 2007) with a new efficient service, but in this case 
international help and small size of the country seem to be very important. Large countries 
like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are hardly able to pursue this strategy.  
On the other hand, natural resource wealth of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan may however have even a negative impact on the development of public 
administration. One of the effects of the “resource curse” documented in the literature is the 
development of the so-called “petro-state”, when the revenue from natural resources allows 
the governments to delay the development of public bureaucracies and reduces pressure from 
their inefficiencies (Alayli, 2005). The problem is indeed present in Central Asia (Sabonis-
Helf, 2004). The point is, however, that the resource curse seems to be linked with the 
specifics of the political system. The impact of politics on the development of public 
bureaucracy is to be examined in the next section. 
An additional resource constraint may be the weak state capacity. It has been 
demonstrated empirically, that the state weakness has a clear negative effect on corruption 
control (Shen and Williamson, 2005). In Tajikistan in the early 1990s the civil war 
environment made any development of efficient (or even somehow functioning) public 
administration impossible. Current political turbulences in Kyrgyz Republic also have a 
negative impact on development of public administration.  
 
3.2. Political regimes and public administration 
One of the most interesting questions from the point of view of success of 
administrative reform is probably how it is related to political regime. The relation between 
bureaucrats and politicians is crucial for understanding the existence of predatory state or 
market enhancing policies in emerging economies (Dixit, 2006). Basically, there are two main 
approaches in the development studies. The first tradition claims that an efficient bureaucracy 
is an outcome of democratization (though, probably, not an immediate and direct one), and 
therefore, a non-democratic country is hardly able to create a well-functioning public sector. 
The most studied aspect of the interaction between political regimes and quality of 
administration is the relation between democratization and corruption. The argumentation in 
the literature, however, mostly deals with corrupt politicians; and does not explicitly consider 
the link between politicians and bureaucrats. The assumption is that bureaucrats immediately 
respond to changes of incentives from (honest or dishonest) politicians; it is obviously a 
questionable statement. One of the key arguments in favor of lower corruption in democracies 
– higher competition and system of checks and balances (Johnson, 2000) – does not work for 
bureaucracies.2 Nevertheless, democracy still may reduce corruption of bureaucrats by 
empowering the population, which may than take direct actions forcing the governments to 
change regulations to lower corruption. Thus democracy actually becomes a system of mutual 
learning of population, politicians (and, unfortunately, corrupt bureaucrats searching for new 
options for rent-seeking as well), may be resulting in reduction of corruption. Moreover, free 
press acts as an additional instrument able to shed light on corrupt behavior and therefore 
increase accountability (Adsera et al., 2004). The problem is, of course, that democracy may 
actually fail to ensure higher accountability as well. For example, even if citizens are 
empowered with the right to fight corruption, they are likely to face a collective action 
problem while using it (Philp, 2001). Moreover, in a democracy corrupt bureaucrats may be 
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 By the way, competition does not necessarily reduce the degree of bureaucratic corruption (Celentani and 
Ganuza, 2001). 
better protected from the pressure of the politicians, unable to resolve to direct repressions. 
Nevertheless, there is a wide literature showing the negative relation between democracy and 
corruption (for a survey see Seldadyo and de Haan, 2006; Seldadyo, 2008); although in the 
post-Communist world there seems to be no significant relation between democracy and 
corruption (Treisman, 2003), the discussed specifics of corruption indicators for Uzbekistan 
and Turkmenistan may influence the results. 
The effects of the petro-state may also depend on the level of democratic development. 
Damania and Bulte (2003) and Robinson et al. (2006) show that the resource curse is present 
particularly in regimes with low political accountability.  Durnev and Guriev (2007) examine 
one of the possible channels of this interaction, looking at the corporate transparency 
developing as consequence of potential expropriation threat. Another channel is discussed by 
Egorov et al. (2007): non-democracies in resource-abundant countries tend to repress media, 
since they face lower need of good information, and therefore indirectly reduce the 
accountability of bureaucracy. That is why democracy may become a necessary precondition 
for exploiting the resource wealth to remove the resource-driven limitations for public 
administration reforms. Otherwise resources corrupt politics, as well as public sector and 
bureaucracy, leading to a self-sustaining inefficient equilibrium. 
From this point of view the non-democratic nature of political systems of Central 
Asian countries may at least contribute to the deficits of public administration. The alternative 
tradition, however, suggests that exactly the ability to establish good bureaucracy is one of the 
key factors allowing some non-democracies to demonstrate extraordinary growth rates. Jamali 
et al. (2007) distinguish between autocracies and bureaucracies as two types of non-
democratic regimes. Bureaucracies, or dictatorships which codify and announce law, do not 
differ from democracies in terms of economic performance. It makes a “roundabout” way to 
economic prosperity possible: instead of developing democratic institutions and trying to 
achieve economic growth, the country can focus on economic and administrative governance 
(e.g. good administration) remaining non-democratic, and thus achieve high growth rates 
(Ahrens, 2008). Indeed, there have been numerous examples of non-democracies able to 
create large and relatively efficient bureaucratic machinery, sustaining their existence for 
centuries. The main advantage of non-democracy is the ability of politics to control 
bureaucracy by force and execute direct pressure over public agencies. This argument is as 
questionable as the “competition” and “social control” arguments for democracy: there may 
be significant information asymmetries, influencing both control of corruption and selection 
of bureaucrats, and non-democracies may experience problems with information transmission 
through the levels of hierarchy (the “yes man” problem described by Prendergast, 1993). 
Moreover, the power logic may also influence the quality of bureaucracy through 
appointment mechanisms. Egorov and Sonin (2006) show that autocrats appoint incompetent 
officials, and Dodlova (2006) claims that low political accountability leads to expansion of 
de-facto authority towards appointed bureaucrats from politicians. Historical experience 
demonstrates large differences in economic performance and quality of governance among 
non-democracies (Besley and Kudamatsu, 2007), hence, it is reasonable to assume, that the 
ability to develop good public administration and economic governance as a substitute for 
democracy is characteristic for particular types of non- and semi-democratic regimes. 
Therefore the main question for this paper is whether the specific type of semi-democracy 
existing in Central Asia is capable of developing good public management institutions. 
Although it failed to manage it in the past, it may still be possible in the future.  
The problem for the Central Asian countries, however, is that most of them (especially 
Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyz Republic, but also to a certain extend in Uzbekistan) 
belong to the group of hybrid regimes. The non-democratic governments enforce their rule, 
being limited in their application of direct force. It is possible to claim, that the hybrids 
combine disadvantages of both democracies and strong non-democracies from the point of 
view of bureaucratic development. First, being unable to use force, or coercive power, the 
politics (or, more specifically, dominating clans) are likely to use corruption as one of the 
instruments of control. Corruption, not repressions, becomes “the blood of the regime” (Mau 
et al., 2007:100). Nevertheless, hybrids are often characterized by poor control over 
individual agencies, able to extract rents, and extraordinary shift of real authority to 
bureaucrats: both instruments – coercion and public control – do not function. Second, 
inefficient bureaucracy may be used as an additional “instrument of control” over private 
actors. If the government uses force as instrument of dominance, it needs an efficient 
bureaucracy to implement the repressions; if it is, however, unable to use force, the very 
inefficiency of bureaucracy becomes a mighty weapon. Individuals and firms have to pay 
bribes and disobey law in order to exist (and cannot survive otherwise); however, that is why 
they can be “taken hostage” by the government, able to legally prosecute them in case of any 
conflict (Libman, 2008). Kazakhstan indeed provided examples of this policy of “hostage-
taking” in the first half of the 2000s (Libman, 2006). There exists a growing literature 
demonstrating a non-linear quadratic or even cubicrelation between corruption and 
democracy: in this case low level of democracy leads to a eruption of corruption, going down 
in higher developed democracies (Montinola and Jackman, 2002; Sung, 2004; Rock, 2007). 
The relation may, however, be even more sophisticated (Treisman, 2007a). Finally, the state 
failure, which has been identified as one of the reasons for the low quality of autocracies, is 
far more often in hybrids than in pure democracies and autocracies (Bates, 2008). 
The problem of hybrid political regimes is obviously absent in Turkmenistan. 
However, until recently the repressive regime seemed to be ideologically directed towards 
reducing public services. Under president Niyazov public educational system was reduced, 
pensions were abolished and public libraries and hospitals were partly liquidated. The new 
president seems to move away from extremes of the old regime, but any assessment is still 
premature.   
 
4.  Decentralization and devolution 
4.1. The logic of decentralization in the post-Soviet world 
The move towards new forms of governing determines the development of the public 
administration worldwide over the last decades. Both developed and developing countries are 
actively involved in the decentralization process (Marks and Hooghe, 2004). In the post-
Soviet world shift of authority between different levels of government became part of the 
overall complex process of economic transition: territorial decentralization of power and 
devolution of services to municipal self-governance level are often considered as key 
elements of successful transformation and thus directly linked to the issue of administrative 
reform (Verheijen, 2002). However both decentralized and centralized forms of governance 
have their advantages and disadvantages, depending upon the specific form and instruments 
of decentralization and the framework institutions determining the interplay of the center and 
the periphery in the particular decentralization scheme (Treisman, 2007). Most post-Soviet 
de-jure allowed different forms of administrative, but not political decentralization, 
establishing a clear hierarchy between the central and the regional authority (with the only 
exception of Russia as a formally federal country, as well as Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia 
with autonomous territories). Even Russia established in 1994 a highly centralized structure 
of fiscal federalism with relatively limited authority of the regions; in fact, differences 
between de-jure federal Russia and de-jure unitary Ukraine, Belarus or Kazakhstan are 
smaller than one would expect, though present (Dabla-Norris, 2000; Lavrov, 2004). On the 
other hand, Treisman (2006) claims that the post-Soviet countries are on average more 
decentralized from the fiscal point of view, than other developing economies. 
One should be aware of the fact that the de-facto decentralization in the post-Soviet 
countries differs substantially from the de-jure decentralization. In the Soviet Union relations 
between different tiers of governance were threefold. First, the country was officially 
organized as a multi-level asymmetric federation. Secondly, the formal decentralization was 
in fact part of a strictly hierarchical political system with absolute dominance of the central 
government; the Soviet Union thus was a “super-unitary” state. However, thirdly, the Soviet 
hierarchy evolved from the 1950s on into a system of multi-level bargaining between 
different power centers with informal property rights over their assets and territories, often 
exchanging the formal loyalty for quasi-autonomy (typical for the Southern republics of the 
Soviet Union). This system of informal bargaining is often referred to as the “administrative 
market” (Kordonskiy, 1995). The collapse of the Soviet Union shifted the power balance in 
the administrative market. While several new independent states were too small to experience 
any significant decentralization, faced too strong external challenges (like Armenia) or 
developed a highly autocratic political system even exceeding that of the late Soviet period 
(like Turkmenistan), several larger republics with relatively weak central government 
experienced the de facto devolution: the regional governments were able to seize significant 
power and became influential players. The classical example is that of the Russian Federation 
with its asymmetric federalism of the 1990s: even after establishment of the formal rules of a 
highly centralized federation in 1994 regional governments continued gaining independence 
through the quasi-constitutional system of power sharing treaties and unilateral actions like 
strategic tax collection and “war of laws” (Libman and Feld, 2008). In Ukraine regional 
governments led by the presidents of regional councils (oblastnoi sovet) became influential 
players in the political system, and the Autonomous Republic of Crimea followed the Russian 
path of unilateral devolution (Turovskiy, 1999).  
However, the informal nature of the decentralization made it vulnerable to power 
shifts; the evolution of the post-Soviet regimes, on the other hand, dictated the consolidation 
of power on the central level (Furman, 2007). Hence, most post-Soviet countries which 
became informally decentralized in the 1990s, switched to increasing centralization when the 
regional semi-autocracies managed to gain power. In Russia the centralization stage replaced 
informal decentralization in the 1990s after the power shift from Yeltsin to Putin; 
nevertheless, even the first term of Putin (2000-2004) and, according to certain claims, the 
first wave of gubernatorial appointments at the beginning of the second term, were 
characterized by relatively high informal autonomy of regional governments (Chebankova, 
2005, 2006, 2007). In Ukraine the shift to centralization occurred earlier under the 
administration of Kuchma, which, however, also tolerated informal autonomy of the regions 
for a relatively long period of time (Turovskiy, 1999). Since the Ukraine, unlike Russia, is 
economically decentralized, the regions still continue playing an important role in the political 
processes in the country, and the political struggles after the Orange Revolution lead to 
repeated discussion of the federalization idea. Nevertheless, the general logic of 
predominance of informal decentralization depending upon the power balance at the central 
level remains valid: the informality of decentralization makes it sustainable only if the central 
authority is weak. 
The informality of decentralization fits quite well in the model of semi-authoritarian 
hybrid regimes and the “hostage taking” as an instrument of control typical for many post-
Soviet countries. In fact, the attempts of the central government to establish control over 
secessionist territories by force in the former Soviet Union failed (and resulted into 
emergence of non-recognized states), while the temporary retreat and acceptance of informal 
decentralization allowed the re-centralization in the future (Ukraine does not fit this pattern, 
but its current political system is also quite different from the post-Soviet standard).3 The 
mechanism of is very similar to that of control over private business: since decentralization is 
informal, it may be removed by applying perfectly legal instruments; their selective 
application may be used as an instrument of control over regional elites. As the previous 
section claimed, semi-authoritarian regimes have an extremely negative impact on public 
administration. It will be shown that the same is true for the devolution in semi-authoritarian 
environment. 
  
4.2. Decentralization in Central Asia 
From the point of view of formal decentralization, all countries of the region are 
unitary and have a multi-level administrative system, inherited from the Soviet past: the 
provinces (oblast, viloyat) include smaller districts, which, in turn, consist of rural and urban 
settlements; the largest cities have the status of oblast or district. The heads of local 
administration are appointed by the central government; the governors (akims, khokims, 
hyakims) act as representatives of the president and heads of regional executive, as well as 
often act as presidents of local legislatures (or propose the presidents, like in Uzbekistan). 
There are local elected councils at provincial and sub-provincial level (maslikhat in 
Kazakhstan, local councils in Uzbekistan, madzhilis in Tajikistan, gengesh in Turkmenistan 
and kenesh in Kyrgyz Republic), which are, however, virtually powerless and often 
dominated by the executive (e.g. Mahmutova, 2004). The structure of subordination is 
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 The only exception is the Chechen Republic, where Russia actually enforce the regime of very high informal 
autonomy. 
hierarchical, but the lower-level jurisdictions often have a dual subordination to the governors 
and the central agencies (Uzbekistan). Uzbekistan includes the autonomous republic of 
Karakalpakstan with its council of ministers and parliament; however, “weak on paper, 
Karakalpak autonomy is even less evident in reality” (Epstein and Winter, 2004: 42). The 
territorial division of Tajikistan is slightly different, including the Gorno-Badakhshan 
Autonomous Province and Region of Republican Subordination under direct rule of the center 
(i.e. not belonging to any province). There are certain elements of self-governance on the 
lowest municipal level (see the collection of papers in Tishkov, 2001, Part 2), e.g. in 
Tajikistan, where local councils (jamoat) have a relatively large de-jure authorities (which 
are, however, extremely limited in practice). Kyrgyz Republic, besides the common local 
legislatures, in 2001 started the pilot elections of the heads of rural municipalities and larger 
cities (Omuraliev, 2002). Uzbekistan added an additional tier to the system in form of self-
governance of local mahalla councils.  
The legal framework for the decentralized governance is relatively well-developed in 
Kyrgyz Republic, which, however, lacks implementation of the existing legislature, which 
still bears several contradictions. In Tajikistan the regulation is still largely based on the law 
established in the early 1990s, though there has been a lot of effort to improve the legislature 
recently. Uzbekistan as of 2007 had virtually no legislature supporting decentralization and 
local self-governance, with the important exception of the mahalla program. From the point 
of view of assignment of competences Kyrgyz Republic and to a lower extend Tajikistan 
made certain effort to clarify the distribution of responsibilities between the central and the 
regional level, which is, however, still lacking. In Kazakhstan and especially Uzbekistan the 
power at the local level is controlled by the centrally-appointed governors. From the point of 
view of the fiscal structure, some countries of the region assign numerous local taxes and 
shared taxes as financial resources to the local governments, but the administration, as well as 
decision rights over tax rates and tax bases are completely controlled by central government 
and the tax revenue is not sufficient for fiscal autonomy of local governments, which still 
heavily depend on interbudgetary transfers. The latter have been, however, to a great extend 
subject to bargaining and hence depend on power distribution. Several countries of the region 
still practice the asymmetric distribution of tax revenue between regional and central 
governments, set for each territory separately and inherited from the Soviet fiscal practices 
(Leschenko and Troschke, 2006; Wright, 2006). Many public services are de jure 
decentralized, but the accountability mechanism is absent and the decisions of local and 
regional governments heavily depend upon central influence (Nikolov, 2006). Local 
governments in Kazakhstan and especially in Kyrgyz Republic own significant property (in 
particular, land ownership in Kyrgyz Republic), which, however, fails to generate significant 
revenue. 
 As mentioned, however, formal decentralization reflects only one side of the coin in 
the region. From the point of view of informal power structure, there are some differences 
between the Central Asian countries. Kazakhstan, as the largest country of the region, 
resembles to a certain extend the pattern of the informal decentralization – recentralization 
dynamics of Russia and Ukraine. In the first half of the 1990s the country experienced a 
severe economic crisis, leading the regional governors to develop their own policies partly 
deviating from the central ones. Moreover, the concentration of FDI inflow in the oil-rich 
Western part of the country also increased the bargaining power of local elites, able to 
influence the appointment of akims. The economically successful regions received a higher 
portion of tax revenue generated from their territory. The results and the mechanisms of 
informal decentralization in Kazakhstan were very similar to those observed in Russia: 
capture of local tax authorities, tax exemptions for companies for donations and inconsistent 
application of central regulations. Hence, the informal decentralization thrived in Kazakhstan 
as well as in other large countries of the CIS. The main difference was probably the higher 
concern of the central government for secession threats of the Northern territories with a 
significant share of the ethnically Russian population and traditional economic ties to Siberia. 
In fact, the potential of internal separatism belongs to the factors making Kazakhstan 
supportive of the post-Soviet integration. 
 Since 1999 economic boom and completion of the power concentration at the central 
level made the policy of recentralization possible. As in Ukraine, the formal appointment of 
akims by the central government made the personnel selection schemes the main instrument 
of recentralization: former members of the central government were appointed as akims. 
Furthermore, the central government re-established control over oil and gas resources of the 
regions through the newly established KazMunaiGas. Territorial shifts of regional borders and 
removal of the capital from the Southern Almaty to Astana in the center of the country also 
contributed to the reduction of political de-facto autonomy of governors (Cummings, 2000; 
Jones Luong, 2004; Paarmann, 2007). Increasing transfers from the center increase the 
dependence of regions from the center (Ufer and Troschke, 2006). Interestingly enough, 
success of de-facto re-centralization seems to support the desire of the central government to 
experiment with different forms of self-governance at the regional level. In 2001 president 
Nazarbaev allowed the pilot elections of heads of rural administrations (a practice resembling 
the rural elections in China, see Thurston, 1998); however, the experiment was ceased in 2003 
and was heavily criticized for non-democratic practices and limited authorities of newly 
elected officials. As mentioned, local governments still own about 80% of public enterprises, 
but the authorities are not clearly separated and the degree of autonomy is in fact very limited 
(Gutovnik, 2006). Thus modern Kazakhstan turned into a de-facto and de-jure highly 
centralized political entity. 
 There is virtually no empirical evidence on the development of the informal power 
structure in other countries of the region. One could probably expect that the civil war in 
Tajikistan in the early 1990s or the current political turbulences in Kyrgyz Republic in the 
second half of the 2000s give rise to development of informal devolution; the evolution of 
center-periphery power distribution depends upon the degree of consolidation of political 
regime in the center. In Tajikistan the power of local authorities differed substantially during 
the civil war, though there has been a strong convergence trend after 1997 (Olimov and 
Olimova, 2001). On the other hand, Uzbekistan seems remain highly centralized throughout 
the period of independence from de-facto point of view as well; local governors have always 
been strictly controlled by the center. Turkmenistan is probably the most centralized country 
in the region; governors are dismissed in short intervals and without any reasonable 
explanation (Leschenko and Troschke, 2006) – once again, due to the very high power 
concentration at the central level. 
There is, however, yet another perspective on Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic and 
Uzbekistan, discussed by Jones Luong (2000). Regardless of the degree of de-facto 
decentralization she documents the strong development of regional interests and political 
identities in the political and economic elites, which manifest themselves in the decision-
making at the central level4. A similar concept in the theory of decentralization is the 
“constitutional decentralization”, i.e. the ability of regions to influence national decisions; in 
the case of the Central Asian countries it is obviously necessary to refer to an “informal 
constitution” as system of rules governing relations within the elite as the basic concept. The 
rise of regional political identities seems to be stronger than the development of tribal and 
local interests as an unexpected result of the Soviet heritage. Regional political interests are 
very important for the modern Kyrgyzstan. The civil war in Tajikistan can be perceived as 
war between regions (Olcott, 2005: 146). It is questionable whether the “public 
manifestations” of regional political identities survived the consolidation of power in 
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 These practices resemble the importance of regional interests in Ukraine, although the mechanism of their 
formation may be different.  
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in the mid-2000s. However, from this point of view one could 
actually claim, that the very nature of any central-level politics in Central Asia is to a certain 
extend related to the competition of regional clans (Starr, 2006); therefore even the re-
centralization can be viewed as a success of a particular regional interest.5 
 
4.3. Decentralization and quality of public administration 
 The central question for this paper is, however, to understand whether the 
decentralization practices and intends in the Central Asian region could be beneficial for the 
quality of governance. Unfortunately, the experience so far has been dismal: there is no 
evidence that even limited decentralization and devolution of power to local municipal self-
governing institutions improved the functioning of the public administration. It is possible to 
distinguish among four main factors making the experience of decentralization problematic: 
the informal nature of political property rights, interventions into economic autonomy of 
individuals and businesses, expansion of public authority through decentralization and 
decentralization with lacking intraregional infrastructure. In what follows I discuss these 
factors in greater detail. Of course, it does not mean that decentralization is unable to have a 
positive effect on the quality of public administration: it rather suggests that decentralization 
per se in the existing institutional environment is unable to generate new incentives for public 
officials.  
 As mentioned above, the predominance of informal practices and institutions 
constitutes an important problem for the public administration. The informal decentralization, 
by its nature implies the continuing use of informal instruments. It does not imply that the 
informal decentralization is unable to have positive economic effects on economic 
development: inefficient public service can be effectively substituted by informal practices of 
public officials. This is exactly the logic of the contested “grease the wheel” corruption 
theory: under certain circumstances, if the administration and legal system are highly 
inefficient, informal channels like corruption can help avoiding publicly created barriers and 
thus become growth-enhancing (Dreher, Gassebner, 2007). Competition between corrupt 
local governments in a decentralized environment can either establish a “race to the bottom” 
from the point of view of corruption like it is reported in India or increase the interest of 
governments in executing the “helping hand” policies for regional industry, as it may have 
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 The success of particular regions in this form of “horizontal” competition may, nevertheless, just form a step 
towards formation of a more traditional “vertical” model of interaction between the center and the regions, as it 
happened e.g. in the early Argentina (Gibson and Faletti, 2004). 
happened with the TVE experience in China. Finally, the impact of inefficient administration 
on growth differs in different political regimes; Aidt et al. (2008) claim that corruption has a 
negative effect on growth in high accountability regime and no effect in low accountrability 
regime. There is certain evidence of growth-enhancing policies of local governors in 
Kazakhstan: in particular the example of the former governor of Semei Galymzhan 
Zhakiyanov is worth mentioning. Nevertheless, it has nothing to do with better public 
administration; on the contrary, these practices just conserve the inefficiencies in the 
bureaucracy. Finally, one should not forget, that the informal decentralization was caused by 
the weakness of the central state: the re-centralization phase is therefore likely to include 
policy measures directed against more successful regional leaders (once again, Galymzhan 
Zhakiyanov is a good example: the provincial governor and wealthy businessman was 
sentenced to prison). In fact, the very practices of informal decentralization, which per 
definition are semi-legal, give the central government the pressure instrument against local 
governments.  
 Decentralization, however, as already mentioned, does not necessarily mean growth-
enhancing policies. Given a particular framework of formal and informal institutions, it just 
creates additional possibilities for rent-seeking. In this case public administration remains 
bad. One of the factors determining the quality of public administration in semi-autocracies, 
as mentioned above, is the desire to use “hostage-taking” to control potential opposition. 
McMann (2006) studies this problem from the point of view of the “economic autonomy” 
reasoning. In order to actively participate in the political processes and to oppose the 
incumbent, citizens and businesses have to achieve certain degree of economic autonomy; the 
semi-democratic incumbent therefore tries to restrict the economic independence of its 
subjects. Regional governments are often quite successful in managing economic autonomy 
of individuals and small enterprises, which actually form the basis for the democracy: thus 
political systems in different regions become different. McMann (2006) documents the use of 
these instruments in less democratic regions of Kyrgyz Republic (as well as Russia). Hence, 
the negative effects of the political system on the quality of public administration may exist 
not only at the national, but also at the local level.  
 Moreover, decentralization may have a greater effect on the borders between state and 
society rather than on the internal organization of bureaucracy per se. Therefore it broadens 
the sphere of inefficiencies created by bad public administration. Noori (2006) provides 
evidence in favor of this statement studying the Mahalla Initiative in Uzbekistan. So far I have 
described Uzbekistan as probably the least decentralized country in the region due to its 
political regime. However, shortly after independence Uzbekistan started a program aiming to 
delegate administration of critical public services to local communities (mahalla) (see details 
in Epstein and Winter, 2004, as well as in Noori, 2006). Although the initiative was actively 
supported by the international NGOs due to both the secular status and the grassroots 
democracy organization of the mahalla, in the early 2000s, Noori (2006) claims, that mahalla 
just turned into an additional coercive instrument of the state. On the one hand, the Mahalla 
Initiative merged the community-based institutions with the state, thus decreasing the ability 
of the society for self-organization – a practice similar to that of the Soviet government. On 
the other hand, there is evidence that mahalla did not improve the quality of the public 
services for the population.  
 Finally, many positive effects expected from decentralization are related to the 
opportunity of active factor flows across regional borders (for example, it is the necessary 
precondition of any interjurisdictional competition). This condition, which is straightforward 
in the developed world or even in Ukraine or European part of Russia, is very uncertain in 
Central Asia. It is particularly problematic for Kazakhstan: large dimensions of the country 
and poor quality of transportation (in particular, railroads) have been a severe problem for the 
economic development of the country (Ekspert Kazakhstan, 2007). Moreover, the countries of 
Central Asia – in particular Kazakhstan as the largest country, but also in Uzbekistan and 
Kyrgyz Republic – are characterized by severe territorial disparities, which seem to increase 
over time (UNDP, 2005; Ufer and Troschke, 2006).  In this environment interjurisdictional 
competition is likely to suffer from agglomeration effects, providing additional benefits to 
selected regions and reducing the pressure on their policies, thus creating a market failure in 
the market for institutions and economic policies. 
  
5. Conclusion 
 The quality of public administration in Central Asia is low and seems to have a 
negative impact on economic development. Omnipresent corruption and high administrative 
barriers belong to important obstacles for growth. Deficits of public administration arise from 
a number of factors: informal institutions, deficits of resources and weak state capacity seem 
to play an important role in all or several countries of the region. A particular factor of bad 
quality of bureaucracy seems to be the political system. The semi-democratic regime of 
Central Asian countries makes inefficient bureaucracy even more likely than both “pure” 
democracies and autocracies, and therefore prevents the “roundabout” way to growth through 
development of good administrative governance without democratic political transition. 
Moreover, this political environment makes the success of administrative reforms, 
implemented in several countries of the region (in the 1990s in Kyrgyz Republic, currently in 
Kazakhstan and Tajikistan) unlikely. 
 Although all Central Asian countries are formally highly centralized, some of them 
experienced a period of significant de-facto decentralization in the 1990s, followed by the re-
centralization in the 2000s. Kazakhstan seems to be the most prominent example of this trend. 
Moreover, regional political identities play an important role in both politics and bureaucracy. 
Nevertheless, the attempt to improve the quality of public administration by decentralization 
and devolution in the region seems to be unsuccessful. The very informal nature of 
decentralization makes its effects questionable. Moreover, a typical feature of semi-
authoritarian regimes is institutional pesudomorphism: institutions are likely to have a 
completely different function than officially declared. In this case governments are able to 
guarantee their power even without resolving to coercion. The example of the Mahalla 
Initiative in Uzbekistan demonstrates that it may be true for institutions of decentralization, 
which in fact can become a “hidden channel” of expansion of state influence.    
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